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Abstract
This chapter analyses land conflicts and cases of land grabbing in Kalehe
(Eastern DRC), a context in which competition for land is rooted in an atmosphere
of violence and ethnic cleavages. By using three case-studies, we illustrate
how, in a context of plurality of norms and rules in the land arena, the rights
of the ‘strongest’ often prevail. Success or failure in acquiring land rights
depends upon actors’ capacity to efficiently instrumentalise the legitimacy of the
Congolese army, of official state agents, and/or of local customary authorities. In
its conclusion, the chapter puts into perspective the dominant conception of land
grabbing, currently highly debated on the international agenda, by analysing how
land conflicts are anchored in a broader context of political competition.
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Competition over soil and subsoil: 
Land Grabbing by local elites in eastern DRC (Kalehe, South Kivu) 
 
Klara Claessens, Emery Mudinga, An Ansoms 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Population growth, environmental degradation, slow rates of economic development and land 
grabbing, all contributed to the transformation of Africa from a continent of land abundance 
into a continent characterised by increasing land scarcity and competition over land (Berry 
2002). However, the contemporary struggles over land are diverse and they depend on the 
particular political, social and economic context in which they occur. Shifts in land access, 
changing property relations and land distribution patterns lead to varying results in different 
contexts. For some actors involved in struggles over land it opens a window of opportunity; 
for others, it leads to dispossession and displacement (Borras & Franco, 2010).  
 
In this chapter, we focus on the role of local elites in cases of land grabbing, a less highlighted 
topic in contemporary literature on the global land rush that puts great emphasis on the role of 
external actors, interested in land investments as a more general response to the food, 
financial and energy crises (Hall, 2011; De Schutter, 2011)1. National elites also are key 
players in land acquisition processes, as direct actors or as brokers between the local 
community and (foreign) investors. However, “national elites often fall below the radar of 
global-level studies because they are seldom regulated or facilitated by public agencies, and 
because individual transactions tend to be smaller” (Anseew et all. 2011: 21, Hilhorst et al, 
2011). We study the role of local elites and their access and control strategies over land in the 
absence of foreign investors by focussing on two case-studies in the territory of Kalehe, 
South-Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo. These cases will demonstrate how local 
groups are strategically framed around issues of land use, land distribution and land control 
and how they are linked to broader national and regional dynamics. Local elite members of 
these strategic groups operate in different political arenas that are vertically and horizontally 
interconnected. They are therefore able to enforce their claims on land at the local level.  
 
We argue that contemporary studies on land grabbing should situate recent evolutions in land 
relations within their specific historical context. Land grabbing is neither a new nor a recent 
phenomenon. Past cycles of land grabbing in Africa include the colonial conquest, and local 
elite’s interest in land as an investment opportunity in response to the structural adjustment 
programs (SAPs) of the 1980s (see Peemans in this volume). Local elites invested in land for 
direct revenue and for future financial security as a response to the devastating effects of the 
privatization measures take under the SAPSs. At various phases throughout history, such local 
elite in Africa have used their status and power and their knowledge of the institutional and 
legal regulations to acquire large land concessions (Berry, 2002). They are more likely to 
navigate in the complex institutional landscape to get comparative advantages at the expense 
of poorer and less connected actors.  
 
Furthermore, land transactions do not take place in a political vacuum as demonstrated by the 
role of domestic aspects and the role of local elites in these processes. In its report on the 
                                                          
1
 For an analysis of less discussed processes driving the current global land grab see also Zoomers, A. (2012) “Globalisation 
and the foreignisation of space: seven processes driving the current global land grab” Journal of Peasant Studies, 37(2):429-
447 
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opportunities and challenges of large-scale land acquisitions, the World Bank recognizes that 
land governance in most developing countries is problematic. Nevertheless, the report’s 
recommendations are rather technocratic and remain limited to the reinforcement of the legal 
and institutional framework (World Bank, 2012). However, land tenure and land 
arrangements are embedded in a complex network of local power relations, and are part of a 
complex institutional landscape. Therefore “land conflicts reflect more than economic and 
demographic pressures, (...) land is also seen as a form of political space-territory to be 
controlled both for its economic value and as a source of leverage over other people” (Berry, 
2009: 24; our emphasis). The situation is even more complex in violent contexts such as our 
case study setting, where over several decades – even centuries – profound ethnic, economic 
and political cleavages have been anchored in the social tissue.  
 
In the next section of this paper, we specify the ways in which land tenure arrangements in 
Eastern DRC have evolved throughout history. We will pay particular attention to the land-
conflict nexus in the specific context of Eastern DRC. We introduce theoretical concepts that 
will help us to understand the land dynamics in the case study settings. In the third part of the 
paper, our case studies illustrate how land relations are negotiated in a context of extreme 
uncertainty and state failure. We pay particular attention to the diverse strategies of local 
elites. In our conclusion we reflect on the importance of taking into account the specific 
political, historical and institutional context, on the conflict-land nexus and on the “victim’s” 
perspective in these local land grabs.  
 
2. Land tenure in Eastern DRC 
 
In South Kivu, land tenure arrangements have been put under serious stress due to population 
growth, opportunistic behaviour of local elites and an increasing number of land claims for 
other than agricultural purposes such as the exploitation of forestry and mining resources 
(Utshudi Ona & Ansoms 2011). Customary tenure arrangements in South-Kivu dominate and 
are based on collective ownership, kinship loyalty and mutual interdependence.  
 
These arrangements are generally embedded in a kalinzi system, which can be described as 
‘an institution that legitimizes the whole social organization by absorbing all persons within a 
given area into a network of dependent relations’ (Van Acker 2005: 81). Kalinzi is a 
customary contract, based upon strict hierarchical relationships, with at the top the king or 
mwami who is the allocator of the land. To become integrated into the network of 
interdependent relationships and to obtain inheritable user rights over land, one has to address 
the customary chief to pay a tribute or kalinzi, most often in the form of cattle. By paying the 
kalinzi, one becomes the subject of the chief. However, over time, these customary 
arrangements and the power of customary chiefs to allocate user rights on land, although still 
persisting today, have been severely challenged and underwent some serious changes.  
 
Colonial powers challenged customary land arrangements for the first time when introducing 
a dual system. They made a distinction between terres domaniales or state land governed by 
state law, and terres indigènes or indigenous land governed by customary law. This duality 
persisted until the introduction of the General Property Law in 1973, making all land official 
state property, including customary lands. The land law provided arrangements for customary 
held land: Article 389 stipulated that land occupied by local communities could be held under 
customary arrangements through a presidential decree. However, this decree has not been 
formulated to date. Since 1973, arrangements of communally held land have thus been 
characterized by high levels of ambiguity regarding their legal status, the rights of the land 
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users and the authorities responsible to govern it (Mugangu Matabaro 2005,Uthsudi and 
Ansoms 2011). Furthermore, due to the weak implementation capacity of the Congolese state, 
the de facto duality between state land and customary land persisted. Vlassenroot and 
Huggins (2005) describe how these historical evolutions resulted in a profound reshaping of 
access rights to land and the reorganisation of rural society. Traditional patron-client 
relationships such as the kalinzi contract gradually eroded, and were partly replaced by new 
forms of patrimonial relations based on economic gain and wealth accumulation. Local 
customary chiefs tried to maintain their position by becoming the gatekeepers of the transition 
period of customary control to the introduction of the modern legal system. The traditional 
order is slowly implicitly being replaced by an order ruled by social stratification. Proximity 
to the political centre became key for wealth accumulation. On an individual level, this radical 
break has led to unequal access patterns, growing tenure insecurity, land alienation and finally 
impoverishment. On a more institutional level, the increasing competition over land created 
opportunities for customary leaders to instrumentalize customary land tenure by reinterpreting 
local norms. In the immediate aftermath of the democratization process initiated by Mobutu in 
the 1990s, land issues were among the factors that lead to violence between ethnic groups.  
 
Land dynamics further complexified during the Congolese wars. Access and occupation 
patterns changed through forced displacement and the hardening of social and ethnic tensions 
(Huggins and Vlassenroot 2005). During the conflict land was a structural cause of conflict 
since unequal access led to the impoverishment of the population and a growing group of 
landless peasants. In some particular cases, land was and still is a proximate cause or a 
resource of conflict. We will demonstrate later in this article how contested land transaction 
and disputes over resource-rich land in the territory of Kalehe are sources of local conflict and 
violence. It should be noticed that in Eastern DRC, a variety of different land-related conflicts 
exist. The majority of conflicts are inter-personal and include very low levels of violence. 
However, when conflicts are linked to ethnicity and identity they often create large-scale 
violence (CRG 2012).  
 
Today, land tenure in the DRC is managed by a variety of authorities and institutions, which 
are all generating norms and rules that canalize the behaviour of individual and collective 
actors. A useful angle to look at these seemingly contraditions and complexities in the 
production of rules and norms is legal pluralism. This highly empirical concept is defined as 
“the normative heterogeneity attendant upon the fact that social action always takes place in a 
context of multiple, overlapping ‘semi-autonomous social fields’ which (…) is in practice a 
dynamic condition” (Griffith 1986:38). A society consists of different social fields such as a 
village, an ethnic community, an association or a state. Each field has different loci of 
authority that overlap and interact with other social fields. Because of this interaction and 
overlap, each field is semi-autonomous. This means that each social field generates internal 
rules and symbols but is also sensitive to decisions and rules that are produced by surrounding 
social fields (Moore 1978).  
 
The institutional landscape is thus by definition heterogeneous, fluctuating, unstable and 
dynamic (Bastiaensen et alii, 2005). The co-existence of different institutions, norms and 
rules with regards to land governance might be instrumentalised by powerful actors using 
economic, political or social means. Customary authorities, for example, occupy a unique 
position on the crossroads between the transforming customary arrangements and their 
knowledge of, and integration in the decentralised state administration. This may lead some 
malicious of them (customary chiefs) to abusive practices, for example when elites register 
land, occupied by the local community, in the national land registry with the complicity of the 
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customary chief who declared the land as ‘unoccupied’ (Utshudi and Ansoms 2011). We can 
thus state that access to land, and control over resources from that land, are negotiated in a 
context that is characterized by unequal power relations.  
 
To help us understand how access to land is negotiated in a context of increasing competition 
over natural resources, we propose using the explanatory concept of political arena 
introduced by Olivier De Sardan. A political arena is a “space in which real conflicts between 
interacting social actors occur around common stakes. It occurs within a local space” (Olivier 
De Sardan 2005:190). The notion of conflict is important, as Olivier De Sardan considers it as 
an intrinsic part of social relations: “conflicts figure among the best ways of penetrating the 
intricacies of society, of revealing its structures, norms and codes, or of highlighting the 
strategies and logics of actors or of groups” (Olivier De Sardan 2005:189). Within a particular 
political arena, individual social actors can gather around a common strategic issue. They may 
then form strategic groups or the “social aggregates of a more empirical and variable nature, 
which defend common interest, especially by means of social and political action” (Olivier De 
Sardan 2005:191). Strategic groups are thus temporarily formed groups of individuals who 
share, for a certain period, the same objectives. The composition of such strategic group may 
fluctuate, is dynamic, and depends upon its temporary members. The struggle over access to 
land may be considered as such a political arena where individual actors and strategic groups 
actively interact to gain and regain access and control over this natural resource.  
 
In the next section, we analyse local land dynamics and the role of local elites’ strategic 
groups to understand how access to and control over land are negotiated in a context of 
uncertainty and state failure. We illustrate through case studies how strategic groups are 
formed and operate around the issue of access to land. 
 
3. Land conflicts in Kalehe 
 
The territory of Kalehe is one of the eight territories of the province of South Kivu in Eastern 
DRC, situated between the two major regional capitals, Bukavu and Goma. It has a surface of 
4082 km² and an estimated population of 524.000 inhabitants (APC 2009). Main economic 
activities in Kalehe are agriculture, cattle breeding, and the extraction of mineral resources. 
The presence of different mining sites and vast concessions of fertile land in the Hauts 
Plateaux intensifies the increasing competition over land between different ethnic groups over 
both occupied and non-occupied land. The territory is characterized by strong cultural 
diversity with the coexistence of different ethnic groups such as the Bahavu, Batembo, 
Barongeronge, Bahutu, Batutsi and Bahunde. Ethnic groups are divided with on one side the 
original (autochthon) and on the other side the immigrant (allochthon) population. The 
frustration of the autochthon population is often articulated around the presence of a 
significant Kinyarwanda speaking population (Hutu and Tutsi) that entered the DRC during 
multiple waves of migration. In the 1950s, a first wave of Banyarwanda immigrants arrived 
when the Belgian colonial administration needed labour force to work on the vast coffee, tea 
and cinchona plantations in the Kivu region. These first immigrants arriving in Kalehe, came 
from Rwanda and from Masisi in the neighbouring province of North Kivu (APC 2009). 
Later, different groups of Banyarwanda arrived as refugees during the different episodes of 
ethnically motivated violence in Rwanda and Burundi.  
 
Since the 1990s, the territory of Kalehe is characterized by the presence of different armed 
groups (APC 2009). At the time of our research (September 2011), six armed groups were 
active in the territory of Kalehe. These groups continue to contribute to an enduring fragile 
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security situation, regularly provoking the displacement of the local population, and enhance 
their social and economic vulnerability. One recent example is the armed movement Nyatura 
which was founded in June 2011. Apart from other military and political agendas (competing 
for grades and high functions within the national army, refusing to be deployed outside the 
Kivus), one of the pillars of the creation of Nyatura was to defend the land rights of Hutu 
inhabitants. Nyatura succeeds the PARECO (Patriotes Résistants Congolais), a movement 
born in 2008 out of the Hutu militia Combattants or Bakobwa. Already in the 1990s, the 
“Combattants” clashed with the Mai-Mai militias of Batembo around identity and land 
question. At the time of our research, however, elements close to Nyatura expressed their 
concern over the issue of returning Tutsi refugees, coming from Rwanda. These Congolese 
Tutsi had fled to Rwanda in 1994, after the influx of Hutu refugees in the DRC following the 
genocide in Rwanda. They are now reclaiming land they once left behind.  
 
Tutsi dominated armed groups like CNDP (Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple) and 
the March 23 movement (M23) have always listed the return of these Tutsi refugees among 
their political claims. They argue that the return of refugees, land issues and nationality 
should be taken into account in the Congolese political agenda in order to resolve the conflicts 
of the eastern DRC2. In the territory of Kalehe, many land conflicts oppose Hutu and Tutsi 
and involve armed forces. Our empirical material shows that the presence of the ex-CNDP 
soldiers in the Congolese army facilitated the return of some Tutsi. Their protection of the 
Tutsi ethnic group might contribute to the radicalization of the position of Nyatura and Hutu 
in general as it recently happened in the struggle over the Numbi village leadership control 
and military commandment among Hutu and Tutsi3.  
 
3.1. Access to land: contestation in the ‘Hauts Plateaux’ 
 
At the time of our research (September 2011), a lot of the identified land conflicts were 
framed around the return of Kinyarwanda speaking Tutsi, which was often perceived as 
problematic by the autochtone population of Kalehe. Originally, these Tutsi settled in Kalehe 
during subsequent waves of migration that took place since the 1950s. Throughout years and 
even decades of presence in the DRC, they had often obtained the Congolese nationality. 
Most of them acquired access to plots of land in the Hauts Plateaux through negotiations with 
the customary chiefs. However, after the Rwandan genocide in 1994, large groups of Hutu 
refugees arrived in South Kivu, fleeing for the RPF4’s violent retaliation actions. 
Subsequently, an inverse migration wave of Congolese Tutsi fled to Rwanda. UNHCR 
estimated that in 2011 approximately 50.000 refugees - of which a majority Tutsi - was living 
in refugee camps in Rwanda. The Rwandan government stated that the number of those living 
outside the camps was about three times higher (Minority Rights Group International 2011).  
 
When leaving the DRC, these refugees sold their land, abandoned it or appointed a caretaker 
from the remaining local population (Bahavu, Batembo and Hutu) during the time of their 
absence. At the time of our research, however, Tutsi were gradually returning to the DRC. 
This caused contestation over the plots of land they had once left behind. Indeed, the 
returning Tutsi want to be reinstated on land that had been occupied by others for the last 17 
years. Moreover, original occupants were often replaced by new actors who had bought the 
land in question, or had obtained it through intermediation of the customary authorities.  
 
                                                          
2
 See for details Stearns J, (2012) 
3
 See for details on the struggle for land and village controlling between Tutsi and Hutu: APC, (2012) and Stearns, J. (2013) 
4
 The Rwandan Patriotic Front took power in Rwanda after the genocide of 1994. 
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During our research, we came across several cases of land conflicts involving Banyarwanda 
Tutsi. We can group these cases into three categories. First, there were Tutsi who claimed 
back land that they had never sold. A second category of Tutsi had sold their plots, but – 
because of the urgency to leave when feeling threatened by the arrival of Hutu refugees in 
Kalehe in 1994 – they had agreed upon a price significantly below the market price. Finally, 
land was reclaimed after a legitimate sale that in several cases occurred before the arrival of 
Hutu refugees. We will discuss each category separately with some concrete examples. 
 
A first group of Tutsi did not sell their land when fleeing to Rwanda. Sometimes, they 
appointed someone to manage the land on their behalf, often a friend or the local chief. After 
an absence of 17 years, the reclaiming of the land is often a difficult matter.  
 
we came across a land conflict that opposed Majé, Freddy and Kirori in the 
Hauts Plateaux of Lemere in the village of Buzunga. When Maje (Tutsi) left the 
DRC, he entrusted Freddy (Mushi) with his cows and his land. He also asked 
his friend and local chief Kirori to safeguard the documents that justified his 
rights to the land. After Majé left, however, Kirori took advantage of his 
absence to sell the land and the documents in question to Freddy. When Majé 
returned in 2011, Freddy refused to cede his rights, considering himself as the 
rightful owner after having paid Kirori5. At the time of our research (December 
2011), the case was still being discussed at the local tribunal. 
 
Other Tutsi left their fields without appointing a caretaker. In several cases, this land has been 
redistributed by the customary authority to new landowners, who refused ceding their plots to 
the returning Tutsi because they believed they were the rightful owners of the land. One of 
our interviewees6 explained :“we thought they had left for good and that they wouldn’t come 
back7”. 
 
Secondly, there are Tutsi who sold their land under the actual market price. Many Tutsi felt 
threatened by the sudden massive influx of Hutu refugees, and therefore proceeded to distress 
sales . During our research, however, we detected very diverse perceptions on what was to be 
considered as a correct prize in 1994. In quite some cases, fleeing Tutsi considered the money 
they received in return for their land as mpamba, literately a provision for ‘on the road’, a 
kind of compensation for being allowed to use the land during the absence of the true owner, 
and not as the selling price. However, those who acquired the land in return for money did 
consider this to be a selling transaction. The following case is an example of such a conflict, 
in which a local mediation initiative was trying to reach a consensus (‘Comité de Dialogue et 
de Médiation, CDM8): 
 
In 1994, a Tutsi sold 780 hectares of land to a Muhavu for 1500 $. This person 
subsequently sold the land to seven different Bahavu and Bahutu families. 
Recently, the original Tutsi owner returned and reclaimed his property. The 
CDM tried to reach a compromise by recognizing the needs of the present 
owners, while at the same time also admitting that the price paid in 1994 did 
not reflect the real market value of the plot. The mediator proposed dividing the 
                                                          
5
 Interviews, 18 October and 25 November 2011, Kasheke and Lemera 
6
 To guarantee the anonymity of our informants, we used pseudonyms.  
7
 Interview, Kasheke, 18 October 2011 
8
 These informal mediation offices were set up by the Congolese NGO ‘Action pour la Paix et la Concorde’ (APC) based in 
Bukavu.  
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land between the old owner (Tutsi) and the present occupants. At the moment of 
our interview, the proposition was not yet accepted by the present occupants9.  
 
A third category of Banyarwanda Tutsi did sell their land for the real market price. However, 
the monetary value of land has drastically increased over the past decade because of 
increasing land scarcity. During our research, several of such cases were cited, among which:  
 
James, one of our interviewees, explained how his Muhavu family was 
implicated in a land conflict with a Tutsi named Ndaro. Ndaro sold his land to 
James’ family and two other families in 1993. This transaction was concluded 
well before the influx of the Hutu refugees in the region. According to James, a 
reasonable price had been paid (1120$ for 22 hectares). Ndaro recently 
returned to sell one of his remaining plots. He obtained a much higher price 
than what he got in 1993. According to James, this incited Ndaro to resell the 
land he once ceded to the three families to a Mushi named Ridego. This 
transaction was concluded in July 2010. The three families in question did not 
accept this transaction and refused access to the contested fields. As an 
argument in their favour, James mentioned that Ridego was well aware of the 
illegitimacy of the transaction as the three families passed a message on the 
radio, announcing that the land was already occupied and thus not for sale10. 
At the time of our research, the case was treated by a local tribunal. Ridego, 
living in Bukavu, had never attempted to access the contested land11. James’ 
family keeps exploiting the contested land, even though Ridego regularly passes 
by with potential buyers. The two other implicated families do not access the 
contested land anymore12.  
 
Another source of contestation and conflict is the destination of the land reclaimed by the 
returning refugees. Several Tutsi are accused of reclaiming land only to sell it to third parties. 
In several cases, reclaimed land had been sold to Kinyarwanda speaking families who had not 
lived in the region before but were attracted by the relatively low costs of land, in comparison 
to the even more populated Rwanda. This was perceived as very problematic by the local 
population. One of our interviewees stated that “nowadays everybody presents himself as a 
refugee13”. Another respondent explained how the return of the refugees as such does not 
pose a problem but how “they are taking others with them. We are observing an infiltration of 
new people […]. Often they are selling their land even if they say they are not going to sell. 
When they would sell to the indigenous population there would not be any problem but they 
should not sell their land to new Tutsi subjects14”. One other person agreed by stating that “all 
ethnicities - Batembo, Bahutu, Bahavu and Batutsi - have the right to access land but it has 
become difficult to distinguish between Congolese Tutsi and foreign Tutsi. Congolese Tutsi 
come with their ‘brothers’ that are not known in the area and this is a big problem15”. Another 
person added that “to claim a plot of land over here, one has to be the real owner or at least 
the descendants of the person who lived here before. Nobody should pretend being the son of 
somebody whereas he is not known in this area”16. 
                                                          
9
 Interview office CDM, APC, Bushushu, 19 october 2011, Bushushu 
10
 Interview 18 October 2011, Kasheke  
11
 Interview 25 November, Kasheke 
12
 Interview, 11 August 2012, Lemera 
13
 Interview, 18 October, Kasheke 
14
 Interview, 19 October, Chibanda 
15
 Interview office CDM, APC, 19 October 2011, Bushushu 
16
 Interview, 19 October 2011, Kalehe 
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At their return, Tutsi of all three categories rarely entered into direct negotiation with the new 
occupants of the land. Instead, more indirect strategies were adopted. One respondent stated: 
“most of them [returning refugees] are not passing through the ‘little door’ [referring to local 
authorities or mediators] but rather through the ‘big door’ [referring to authorities at a higher 
level]”17. In other cases, returning Tutsi called in the help of armed forces to reinforce their 
claim, particularly implicating ex-CNDP18 elements who had been integrated in the 
Congolese Army, FARDC. One person explained that “for some [of the Tutsi], we do 
recognise that the land belongs to them. But why do they have to use the army to claim their 
rights? This gives us a bad impression”19. Another interviewee explained how some Tutsi 
actors used armed forces to (re)claim the land: “When a Tutsi realized he is failing [to get his 
land back], he is going to seek an armed group to combat the civilians. This is why we often 
hear about confrontations between civilians and armed groups about land problems20”21.  
 
Indeed, Tutsi returnees’ claims seemed to be a fertile basis for other population groups’ 
mobilization into new armed groups with the aim to protect their interests. One example from 
the bordering province of North Kivu is the APCLS or the Alliance Patriotes du Congo Libre 
et Souverain. According to a 2011 report of the panel of experts of the UN, “APCLS is the 
strongest Mai Mai in North Kivu, mobilizing its forces on the basis of popular resistance to 
Tutsi refugee returns, traditional land rights, and defence against the expansion of the Tutsi 
and Hutu dominance in the Masisi territory” (UN 2011, para. 219: 65-66). In the province of 
South Kivu, and the territory of Kalehe more particularly, we already cited the armed group 
Nyatura. According to a report of a local NGO, Action pour la Paix et la Concorde (APC), a 
land conflict opposing Hutu and Tutsi lied at the basis of the foundation of this armed 
movement. According to one of our respondents, a Hutu, it was not unthinkable that other 
armed groups would be founded; “at the level of our Hutu community there is the spirit of 
self-defence of our interests”. When we asked if these groups already existed and how they 
are organized the respondent replied: “we know each other22”.  
 
We also recorded cases where customary authorities had been instrumentalised to reinforce 
the land claims of returning refugees. One respondent explained how a Tutsi had mobilized 
the customary chief to approve his ownership rights on a piece of land that had previously 
been sold to two different families. Our respondent described the customary chief in question 
as “too young”, “he [the customary chief] doesn’t know how our custom really works” and 
“he is infatuated with the smell of money”23. This perceived insincerity of some customary 
chiefs was cited during several of our interviews, with references made to alleged corruption 
and dishonesty. One respondent explained how some customary chiefs attributed the same 
plot of land to different persons. He continued saying that “that is the real problem with the 
customary chiefs: the sons of the original customary chiefs have to reposition themselves after 
the death of their fathers. Today, they are demanding us a paper (customary document 
attesting the rights to land), something that did not exist in the old days, as a proof that our 
parents have paid the Kalinzi. The young chief uses this ‘requirement’ to reposition himself. 
He can dispossess people, mostly the poor, and attribute the land to the rich and to elites who 
                                                          
17
 Interview group of miners, 19 October 2011, Nyabibwe 
18
 Congrès National pour la défense du Peuple, a rebel party founded by Laurent Nkunda and supported by Rwanda. The 
CNDP were integrated into the Congolese army in 2009. 
19
 Interview, 19 October 2011, Chibanda 
20
 Interview, 12 November 2011, Numbi 
21
 It should be noted that in Eastern DRC, there is a long history of rebel movements supported by Tutsi. Some examples are 
the AFDL (1996), the RCD (1998-2003) the CNDP (2004) and more recently the M23(as from March 2012).  
22
 Interview, 12 November 2011, Numbi 
23
 Interview, 18 october 2011, Kasheke 
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often not even intend to live on the land”24. Also the following case illustrates how customary 
chiefs try to reposition themselves to keep their authority in a quickly changing institutional 
landscape.  
 
In Numbi in the ‘hauts Plateaux’ of Kalehe, customary chiefs played a pivotal 
role in a variety of land conflicts that opposed different ethnic communities. 
The history of these conflicts often dates back prior to 1994. A Muhavu 
interviewee explained us how the Kinyarwanda speaking population entered 
Kalehe from Rwanda and from Masisi in North Kivu during the 1950s. They 
asked land to the customary chief, Hubert Sangara. At that time, there was still 
enough vacant land available. But Sangara also gave concessions on land that 
had already been granted to local families who had not been able to exploit it. 
During this period, between 1950 and 1970, several Hutu and Tutsi families 
acquired land through the payment of the customary tribute or the Kalinzi.  
The real problem started when Hubert Sangara was succeeded by his son 
Raymond Sangara in the 1980s. The demand for land increased significantly 
and the new mwami adopted a new strategy. He identified weak and poor 
subjects, grabbed (part of) their land and kept it for himself or sold it to more 
powerful and rich newcomers, mostly Tutsi. The chased subjects had little 
maneuver to protest and to resist the eviction. One interviewee explained that 
“Sangara wanted more space for his plantations […] he chased all the 
inhabitants who were living there and he even grabbed their land. […] Sangara 
succeeded his ‘coup’ because he was not just anybody. Who could bring to trial 
a big personality such as Sangara? That is why the inhabitants estimated it was 
better to leave the area and abandon their fields25”.  
Then, in 1994, certain of the original occupants - who had obtained their land 
from Hubert Sangara – took advantage of the departure of most Tutsi to retake 
the land that used to be theirs. They argued that the transactions made by 
Raymond Sangara in the 1980s were illegal, and that they were the legitimate 
owners of the land26. Further complications arose during the rebellion of the 
Rassemblement Congolais pour le Démocratie (RCD) between 1998 and 2003. 
The customary chief, Raymond Sangara, maintained close relationships with 
this movement. He again played an important role in favouring Tutsi land 
claims (Namegabe 2005). During the transition period (2003-2006), Raymond 
Sangara played a role in the politics of massive acquisition of land in the 
‘Hauts Plateaux of Kalehe’. The most recent examples date from August 2011 
when Sangara was involved in a conflict opposing Hutu families and a Tutsi 
family in the Numbi area and his pivotal and influential role in the changing 
leadership of the village in which a Hutu was replaced by a Tutsi.  
 
These various case studies illustrate how different strategic groups - often formed around a 
common ethnic identity – are framed around the access to land. We highlighted the 
ambiguous role of different customary and military elites. Both groups are able to maintain 
their power base; customary authorities because of their historically granted position in 
society and military actors because of the violent enforcement of their claims. At different 
occasion, customary chiefs instrumentalized their customary power to favour certain parties – 
in return for money – in the distribution of land. These dynamics show us how land conflicts 
                                                          
24
 Interview, 19 October 2011, Kalehe 
25
 Interview, 12 November 2011, Numbi 
26
 Interview, 12 November 2011, Numbi 
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over land (re)allocation and (re)distribution are anchored within local power struggles. 
Although not all land conflicts can be scaled down to ethnic cleavages, the described cases 
nevertheless illustrate that ethnicity is an important element in the mobilization and the re-
mobilization of strategic groups and that these kinds of conflicts often produce violence. For 
example, the ethnic affiliation of the local military elite is a determining factor in obtaining 
access to the resources. The following quote could not summarize this better: “when the army 
changes, the problems also change”27. The success of local actors to access the land is partly 
based on their ability to connect themselves with these military and customary authorities. 
This institutional connectedness makes them more successful in navigating through the 
complex and plural institutional landscape.  
 
3.2. Access to the mineral resources: economic interest and land in the mining sites of 
Nyabibwe 
 
The competition over land can become even more fierce and complex when minerals are 
found on the land. Because of the potentially high economic gains, local elites compete over 
the access of the resources. This adds another layer of individual actors, strategic groups and 
institutions. Also the competition over the land with mineral resources takes place in an 
atmosphere of violence and the construction of implicit or explicit ethnic agendas.  
 
In Nyabibwe, in the groupement of Mbinga North, two cooperatives are disputing access to 
the mining site of Kalimbi, each with its own legitimizing discourses and access strategies. In 
the 1970s, a French company, SEREMI (Société d’Etudes, de Recherche et Exploitation 
Minière) discovered cassiterite on the hill of Kalimbi. Early 1980s, the site was exploited by 
the industrial mining company SMDG (Société Minière de Goma). Following a strong decline 
in the price of raw materials at the worldwide market in 1986, SMDG abandoned all its 
activities. They dismissed all labourers except for 22 people who were assigned to guard the 
site under the supervision of an engineer-geologist Muteba28. Early 1990s, the chief of 
groupement Mbinga North, Jules Chirimwami, took over all goods of SMDG. After his death, 
his brother, businessman Placide Chirimwami took his place. In 1993, Placide Chirimwami 
founded the cooperative COMBECKA (Coopérative Minière pour le Bien-Etre 
Communautaire de Kalehe). He undertook several attempts to expel the artisanal diggers, who 
occupied the mining shafts since the departure of Muteba. COMBECKA’s members were the 
different team leaders, who each engaged a group of diggers. Ten per cent of the production 
went straight to Chirimwami, 45% went to the team leader and 45% to the diggers. However, 
the latter were obliged to sell their share to their team leader for a fixed price. In 1993, the 
provincial authorities of South-Kivu officially recognized COMBECKA and granted it the 
right to manage the goods left by SMDG (Cuvelier 2010).  
 
Since its foundation in 1993, the management of COMBECKA has been contested several 
times by local and other actors. In response, COMBECKA used a variety of strategies to 
maintain its control over the mining site. During our research, it was difficult to obtain exact 
information about which group controlled the mine and for which period of time. 
Interestingly, the discourse of different actors on who controlled the mine at which time 
deffered, dependent upon their position in the fight over access to the site. The dates 
mentioned in the case study are thus approximations. 
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First, the creation of competing cooperatives influenced the leadership structure of the mining 
site. Around 2005, a group of miners founded CMKD (Coopérative Minière pour le 
Development de Kalehe). According to one of the founders of CMDK, they controlled the 
mine for a period of two years between 2005 and 2007. However, according to certain 
representatives of COMBECKA, these miners were only there for a period of three months, 
coinciding with the occupation of Nyabibwe and its environment by the CNDP of Laurent 
Nkunda29. The representatives recalled how the executive staff of COMBECKA fled the area, 
which incited the CMDK miners to take advantage of their absence to occupy the shafts3031. 
COMBECKA claims to have reinstated their control over the mine after this short occupation 
of CMDK. 
In 2010, COMBECKA was challenged again. Former members of CMDK strategically used 
the general insecurity situation to create COMIKA (cooperative minière de Kalimbi). Since 
COMIKA’s creation, COMBECKA and COMIKA dispute over access rights, and these 
disputes regularly lead to violence. According to a member of COMIKA, COMBECKA 
exploited the mining sites in a non-transparent fashion. Moreover, it seemed that Chirimwami 
(the founder and coordinator of COMBECKA) tried to install his own connections (“friends 
and family”) in key positions: “[Chirimwami] violated the rights of the members [of 
COMBECKA] […] he considers the cooperative as his private property32”. According to 
certain members of COMIKA, they took control over the site in 2008 because COMBECKA 
had abandoned the site: “They [COMBECKA] failed to organize the expenses. When they 
left, COMIKA took the opportunity to enter the site and to start exploitation because there 
was an economic crisis33”. COMBECKA – according to these interviewees – had been 
incapable of investing in the necessary equipment such as generators and motorized pumps. 
COMIKA then managed the mine for two years (between 2008 and 2010). According to its 
members, COMIKA received legal documents in September 2010 that granted them official 
exploitation rights34.  
 
An influential member of COMBECKA, however, brought up an entirely different version of 
the events that took place around 2008-2009. He linked the presence of COMIKA to the 
presence of armed Hutu in the mine. By doing so, this interviewee framed the conflict 
between the two cooperatives in ethnic terms. According to this informant, PARECO (a 
movement born in 2008 out of the Hutu militia Combattants ou Bakobwa) “occupied the mine 
in 2009”; “this seems to be the economic policy of our Hutu brothers: wanting to grab all of 
our wealth, land and cows35”. This statement should, however, be nuanced. PARECO never 
occupied the mine. However, the armed group was indeed quite active in the mountains 
surrounding the mining site and therefore did exert their influence on the transaction and trade 
of minerals. In 2008, after the conference of Goma, PARECO was officially integrated in the 
FARDC36. After this integration process, some of the ex-PARECO FARDC officers started to 
control mining shafts in Nyabibwe.  
 
                                                          
29
 Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) is a Tutsi-based rebellion that was created in 2004 by Laurent 
Nkunda.  
30
 Interview representatives COMBECKA, 15 November 2011, Nyabibwe 
31
 Interview representatives COMIKA, 14 November 2011, Nyabibwe 
32
 Interview representatives COMIKA, 14 November 2011, Nyabibwe 
33
 Interview representatives COMIKA, 14 November 2011, Nyabibwe 
34
 Interview representatives COMIKA, 14 November 2011, Nybibwe 
35
 Interview, 20 October 2011, Mukwidja 
36
 These integrated ex-PARECO soldiers were under the FARDC commandment of a certain colonel Guigui who had been 
arrested in Bukavu in 2011 because he had been caught transporting minerals in a vehicle of the FARDC. 
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In 2010, SEASSCAM37 organized a meeting with representatives of the two different 
cooperatives (COMBECKA and COMIKA) to inform them that neither of the two 
cooperatives met the necessary legal requirements to claim the full rights over the mine. After 
this meeting, several armed miners wanted to occupy the shafts. They were stopped by 
members of COMIKA who controlled the site at that time (our research, see also Cuvelier 
2010 and UN 2011). The violent confrontations resulted in one death and several persons 
were wounded. According to certain members of COMIKA, Chirimwami (founder and 
coordinator of COMBECKA) initiated the violence, having recruited labourers from his 
plantation to occupy mining shafts38. According to COMBECKA, however, it was COMIKA 
who violated COMBECKA’s rights by exploiting the contested site. On the 31 August 2010, 
the administrator of the territory of Kalehe declared that COMIKA had the right to manage 
the site until the installation of a neutral management committee (Cuvelier 2010). This 
committee with members of the two cooperatives was installed one year later by the public 
authorities in July 2011. For each function, two persons were assigned; one of COMIKA and 
one of COMBECKA. According to several members of COMIKA, this structure proved to be 
rather unproductive because of the lack of confidence between the two cooperatives. A 
representative of COMBECKA described the situation is ‘provisional’: “the province asked 
us to cooperate with the others but we can chase them later […] I have my children who are 
capable and I know that one day [we] will regain control39”. 
 
The introduction of another actor led to further complications. In 2007, Shamika Resources, a 
Canadian mining company started its exploration phase in Kalimbi. One of the four 
exploration permits in the hands of Shamika Resources, covers the area of the mining site of 
Kalimbi in Nyabibwe. The presence of this industrial mining company caused contestation 
among the artisanal miners who feared losing their jobs (Cuvelier, 2010). Local civil society 
and the provincial minister in charge of mining spoke about an illegal exploitation. Shamika 
Resources dismissed these allegations: “we are legally authorized to do this [exploring the 
resources] but we are not yet exploiting. We are not yet arrived at the exploitation phase. We 
are in the exploration phase40”. Up to date, the exploitation phase did not take off. According 
to the president of Shamika Resources, there has been a contact between the company and 
Chirimwami who presented himself as the legal land owner and manager of the cooperative 
who exploits the site(COMBECKA). Shamika proposed to pay him a compensation if his 
rightful ownership of the site could be proven (Cuvelier, 2010).  
 
These three contestations - the presence and influence of armed groups, the formation of a 
competing cooperative and the presence of an industrial mining company - have weakened the 
bargaining power of Chirimwami. In order to assure control over the mining site, Chirimwami 
has adopted a military strategy. According to certain sources, Chirimwami was closely linked 
to elements of the FARDC, particularly a group with an ex-CNDP affiliation of which he 
appointed a military person as the manager of the mining site (see also Cuvelier 2010).  
 
Despite the different interests of all actors involved, and the various phases of contestation, 
Chirimwami seemed – at the time of our research - to maintain actual control over the mine. 
According to some members of COMIKA, Chirimwami was the main buyer of cassiterite in 
the region, connected through strong commercial links with Rwanda: “Placide draws his 
money straight out of Rwanda. He takes money and he gives it to the members of 
                                                          
37
 The ‘Service d'Assistance et d'Encadrement du Small Scale Mining’ (SEASSCAM) has been founded 2003 to support 
artisanal miners.  
38
 Interview representatives COMIKA, 14 November 2011, Nyabibwe 
39
 Interview member of COMBECKA, 20 October 2011, Mukwidja 
40
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COMBECKA. He asks his compliers to buy and to bring him all the cassiterite to take to 
Rwanda to sell it over there”. Additionally, the UN panel of experts stated that, according to 
local businessmen, Chirimwami had meetings with Bosco Ntaganda41 in Goma in March 
2011 to discuss on the organisation of a military intervention by the ex-CNDP Colonel 
Saddam Ringo42, a close ally of Ntaganda. The UN report states that through the Ringo-
connection, COMBECKA was able to transport the minerals across the Kivu lake to 
Rwanda43. It is interesting to note that during the mining suspension, the same Colonel Ringo 
protected the trading activities of Chirimwami’s protagonist COMIKA. This clearly shows the 
volatility of strategic groups. Furthermore, in June 2011, Chirimwami invited colonel 
Nsabimana Mwandagabo, an FARDC brigade commander in Kalehe to discuss the 
reinstallation of COMBECKA. This has been confirmed by local authorities44.  
 
The case study of the mining site of Nyabibwe illustrates how access and control over 
resources is secured through alliances and counter alliances that implicate different actors, 
different levels of governance and different strategies. As is the case with land conflicts, the 
legitimacy and the power of each actor to access and exploit the resources, is rooted in their 
economic and political capacity to manipulate armed actors (army or militia) and to use state 
and customary services to obtain legitimizing documents. The relation between the different 
actors is based on economic motives but also inter-ethnic competition over resources plays a 
role in the competition between the two cooperatives. For example, economic transactions in 
Nyabibwe are dominated by Hutu while Havu are mostly involved in administration. The 
deployment of the ex-PARECO members (Hutu dominated) in the area in 2008-2009, 
reinforced the capacity of a specific group of miners linked to COMIKA. An essential part of 
COMIKA’s members are indeed Hutu whereas COMBECKA’s leadership is more linked 
with Tutsi and their clear economic links with Rwanda. This shows how the hostile climate in 
the mining site is to some extend based on identity cleavages and inter-ethnic competition 
over resources.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has analysed particular land conflicts and cases of land grabbing in Kalehe 
(Eastern DRC), occurring in an atmosphere of conflict and ethnic cleavages. The chapter has 
highlighted the roles that local elites adopt in negotiation mechanisms, and has identified their 
strategies to obtain and maintain control over land, mines, and their rents in a context of 
competition over resources and institutional complexity. The lessons drawn from the case 
studies bring us to four main points.  
 
First, the different case-studies clearly show how negotiations over access to and control over 
land do not take place in a political or historical vacuum. They are negotiated in a highly 
politicised and historically specific context. The examples cited in this chapter are mainly 
cases of local land conflicts and over mining sites, but they are linked to dynamics at national 
and regional levels. Indeed, inter-ethnic competition over land is a regional issue, rooted in 
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 Bosco Ntaganda was the deputy leader of the CNDP movement that was under the commandement of General Laurent 
Nkunda. The later was defeated in 2008 and was replaced by Bosco Ntaganda who joined the Congolese peace process in 
2009. The CNDP was a Tutsi dominated armed militia that operated in the Kivu region from 2004 to 2009. Following the 
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November 2012 that Bosco Ntaganda was involved in the M23 rebel movement.  
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43
 Group of Experts on the DRC (S/2011/738), paragraphe 465, p. 119-120 
44
 Group of Experts on the DRC (S/2011/738), paragraphe 464, p. 119 
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the history of the Great Lakes region that is characterized by subsequent cross-border 
migration patterns and inter-ethnic conflicts. This draws the attention to the importance of 
including the political and historical context in the debate on land grabbing.  
 
Second, the local institutional context influences and shapes these struggles over resources. In 
the DRC, the malfunctioning state apparatus contributes to the complexity of land conflicts. 
In the case of the mining sites of Nyabibwe, the two competing cooperatives have each at 
their turn presented official, though contradictory, documents recognizing their right to 
exploit the resources. In the case study of the returning refugees, the land issue is linked with 
corruption and the incapacity of the state to control its territory and its armed forces. The 
nature of the land conflicts change with the deployment of military and armed groups that 
align to ethnic agendas. This fluctuating and volatile institutional context offers opportunities 
for powerful actors.  
 
Third, our cases demonstrate that there are clear linkages between the access to land and 
conflict. The impact of conflict on the access mechanisms of local actors is twofold. First, a 
situation of conflict and violence change the institutional landscape. New rules and norms are 
shaped. This newly formed institutional situation might offer opportunities for powerful 
actors to turn these rules in their advantage. Second, land grabs that occurred during the 
conflict, for example as a result of displacement, might be the source of new conflict. In both 
of our cases this duality is clear. The case of the returning Tutsi refugees showed us how 
complex patterns of displacement and return caused by conflict offer opportunities to 
powerful actors. Customary chiefs took advantage of the departure of the Tutsi to sell occupy 
their land. This was the cause of a new conflict. Later, the returnees used actors from the 
newly shaped institutional environment, the integrated ex-CNDP, to reinforce their access. 
Also in Nyabibwe, the subsequent presence of different armed groups created opportunities 
for economic actors to seize control over the mine, causing contestation of other groups.  
Finally, the apparently less powerful individuals and groups affected by processes of land 
grabbing are not passive victims in land conflicts. Instead, they prove to be conscious actors 
seeking to improve their livelihoods. Our cases show how various seemingly weaker actors 
managed to invent and reinvent strategies for gaining access to resources. For example, in 
Nyabibwe, independent miners founded a cooperative (CMDK – later COMIKA) competing 
with the interests of local elites. Another example of the agency of ‘victims’ in land conflicts 
is provided through the case study described above, opposing three Bahavu families and one 
Tutsi family. The three families passed a message on the radio, warning people for potential 
‘illegitimate’ sales. This illustrates how the power of elites is - contested at the local level. It 
should, however, be noted that despite these acts of resistance and protest, the room for 
manoeuvre and contestation is limited. Two of the three implicated families of the previous 
mentioned case study lost their land and the single remaining family has been treated and 
imprisoned at several occasions.  
 
Overall, this chapter has shown how land conflicts and cases of land grabbing cannot be 
addressed in isolation of the local, national and even regional historical, political and 
institutional context. We have shown how, in a context of plurality of norms and rules in the 
land arena, the rights of the ‘strongest’ often prevail. These ‘stronger actors’ are not only 
more resilient in terms of financial capacity but also, and even more importantly, in terms of 
formal and informal institutional connectedness. Success or failure in acquiring land rights 
depends upon actors’ capacity to strategically use and often manipulate the Congolese army, 
official state agents, and/or of local customary authorities in order to maintain or regain 
control over the resources. These local practices of land grabbing deserve academic attention 
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because they are an important source of information on local practices of land governance and 
their political, historical and institutional context. Furthermore in the particular case of 
Eastern DRC, where land is a source and a resource of conflict, these local practices of land 
grabbing have the potential to fuel existing conflicts or even serve as a source of new conflict.  
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